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Abstract 
This paper presents a statistical analysis of past accidents that occurred between 
1988 and 2012 reported to the European Commission’s Major Accident Reporting 
System (eMARS) focusing on Human and Organizational Factors (HOF). The main 
purpose of this work is to quantify the HOF integrated with conventional risk 
assessment approaches and to provide future guidelines to relevant standards and 
current best practices. 
The accident analysis results are further used to quantify the HOF assessment based 
on the probabilistic Rasch model. A new approach, Method for Error Deduction and 
Incident Analysis (MEDIA) is proposed which can be used with Quantitative Risk 
Assessment (QRA) studies for chemical process industry. 
Keywords: Human and organizational factor, accident investigation, chemical 
process industry, quantitative risk assessment, HAZID identification.  
1 Introduction 
The human and organizational factors (HOF) have a very important role to maintain 
the integrity of operations and equipments in chemical process industry. Nivolianitou 
et al. (2006) have concluded after performing an accident investigation of major 
accidents reported to European major accident reporting system (MARS/eMARS) 
that, 40% of the major accidents have an immediate cause related to human factors. 
Furthermore, Bello and Colombari (1980) also highlighted after performing a survey 
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that at least 40% of total abnormal events during industrial activities are caused by the 
human factors. OGP (2010) also strengthen the notion of HOF by claiming that 
human factor aspects during normal and maintenance operations account for around 
30% of loss of containment (LOC) events. 
1.1 Overview of Human Reliability Methods 
It has been reported by Alvarenga et al. (2014) that human reliability analysis (HRA) 
in general lacks a human reliability database. While, Lees’ (2012) has pointed out that 
large number of human error data points are collected from nuclear industry. 
A number of human reliability methods already existed, some of these methods are 
reported in Table I. 
Table I: Review of some of the existing human factor methods 
Method Domain 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
References 
Predictive Human Error 
Analysis (PHEA) 
Chemical Qualitative 
Embrey (1992), Baber and Stanton 
(1996) 
Tecnica Emiprica Stima 
Errori Operatori 
(TESEO) 
Chemical Quantitative Bello and Colombari (1980) 
System for Predictive 
Error Analysis and 
Reduction (SPEAR) 
Chemical Qualitative 
CCPS (1994), sited in Lees’ and 
Stanton et al. (2005) 
Techniques for Human 
Error Rate Prediction 
(THERP) 
Nuclear Quantitative Swain and Guttmann (1983) 
Standardized Plant 
Analysis Risk-Human 
Reliability Analysis 
(SPAR-H) 
Nuclear Quantitative Gertman et al. (2005) 
Human Error Analysis 
and Reduction Technique 
(HEART) 
Nuclear Quantitative Williams (1986) 
The PHEA method has adopted the error classification against the behavioural 
taxonomy. While, TESEO was developed to quantify the reliability of control room 
operator based on five parameters. The SPEAR method uses the error classification 
initially developed in PHEA but also includes the affect of performance shaping 
factors (PSF). The THERP was the first systematic approach for HRA which can 
quantify HRA by using an event tree structure, which can also provide the 
dependency among tasks and the affect of PSF. The SPAR-H method provides the 
nominal human probability  for “operational” and “diagnostic” tasks that are 1×10ˉ3 
and 1×10ˉ2, respectively. The SPAR-H method provides both +ve and -ve affect of 
PSF on human reliability. However, the use of scale and PSF levels in SPAR-H lacks 
the justification and validation as also pointed out by Laumann and Rasmussen 
(2015), who have tried to adjust the SPAR-H PSF levels for chemical industry based 
on expert’s opinion. The HEART by Williams (1986) quantifies the human reliability 
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for nine different generic tasks and considers the affect of error producing conditions 
(EPCs) by applying the relevant multipliers.  
In this work, emphasis was done to perform the HOF assessment integrated with 
major risk assessment/management techniques in order to improve the overall plant’s 
safety and to make the risk management procedure more efficient and cost effective. 
Therefore, some of the risk assessment/management techniques are briefly 
highlighted in the following section. 
1.2 Major Risk Assessment/ Management Techniques 
There are number of techniques that are widely used in chemical process industry to 
evaluate and manage risk during any phase of a project’s life time. Some of these 
techniques are highlighted in Table II with associated standards or guidelines. 
Table II: Review of risk assessment/ management techniques  
Method 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
Relevant Standards/ Engineering Guidelines 
Hazard Identification 
(HAZID) 
Qualitative ISO 17776 (2000) 
Hazard and Operability 
(HAZOP) study 
Qualitative IEC 31010 (2009), IEC 61882 (2001) 
Quantitative Risk Assessemnt 
(QRA) 
Quantitative 
CCPS (2000), Purple-Book (2005), Perry and 
Green (1997) 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) 
assessment 
Semi-
qualitative 
IEC 61511 (2003) 
Layer of Protection Analysis 
(LOPA)  (also called barrier 
analysis) 
Quantitative IEC 31010 (2009) 
The HAZID is a technique for the identification of all significant hazards associated 
with a particular activity under consideration, ISO (2000). The International standard 
ISO (2000) provides checklists to identify the potential hazards. The table C. 8 in the 
standard provides checklists for hazard identification during operations, which can be 
modified based on current work. The HAZOP study uses guidewords to identify the 
possible deviations from operations. A QRA is a methodology for determining the 
risk of the use, handling, transport and storage of dangerous substances. (Purple 
Book, 2005). The results from a QRA are provided in the form of a safety report to 
demonstrate if calculated risk from an establishment is in acceptable zone. The 
procedures to determine whether a safety report has to be made are provided in the 
EU Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU) as also mentioned in the Purple Book (2005). 
The SIL assessment defines the level of integrity required by a safety instrumented 
function (SIF) to prevent/mitigate the hazardous event. While, during the LOPA 
analysis it can be determined if there are sufficient measures to prevent or mitigate a 
risk. However, the main use of LOPA is to provide the specification of independent 
protection layers (IPLs) and SIL (SIL levels) for instrumented systems as describes in 
standard IEC 61511 and also mentioned in standard IEC 31010. A LOPA study can 
also be used to allocate risk reduction resources effectively by analysing the risk 
reduction (IEC 31010). A LOPA can help to identify the most critical layers to spend 
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further resources and time (IEC 31010). The Figure 1 depicts the safety layers 
concept which is normally used for risk reduction in chemical process industry. 
1.3 Integration of Human and Organizational Factors  
A number of attempts have been made in the past to integrate the HOF aspects with 
the risk assessment techniques. For example, Øien (2001) has provided the 
organizational risk influence model (ORIM) to estimate the impact of organizational 
factors on the risk as compliment to QRA studies. Barrier and operational risk 
analysis of hydrocarbons release (BORA-Release) method was developed to calculate 
the establishment’s specific conditions of technical, human, operational and 
organizational influencing factors and their impact on the barrier’s performance that 
are established to prevent the hydrocarbon release as illustrated by Aven et al. (2006). 
The ω-factor approach has been developed by Mosleh et al (1997) to quantify the 
affect of sub-organizational attributes on equipment’s reliability and on operator’s 
performance. This model has used the concept of inherent failure characteristics and 
characteristics induced by organizational factors for both equipment and operator. 
The I-Risk approach quantify the affect of the management/organizational factors to 
QRA risk calculations by performing an audit. The organizational factors are assessed 
according to provided weights and ratings as proposed by Papazogloua et al. (2003). 
 
Figure 1. Risk reduction method, adapted from IEC 61511-3 (2003) p. 10 
In another attempt to integrate the HOF, SchÖnbeck et al. (2010) has proposed a new 
approach to adjust the design values of safety integrity levels by considering the 
operational affect of the HOF, which can adversely impact the design risk reduction 
expressed as safety integrity levels. In this work, SchÖnbeck et al. (2010) has 
identified eight safety influencing factors with a potential to influence the 
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performance of safety instrumented functions. Therefore, by providing weights and 
rating to these factors operational SIL can be obtained from design SIL. 
In order to provide an integration of HOF with current risk assessment techniques, it 
has been decided to learn from past accidents, that can also provide the necessary data 
required to quantify a HOF analysis. 
1.4 Learning from Past Accidents  
The past accidents can be used to learn lessons retrospectively and to apply the 
lessons learned in a prospective manner. The International standard also illustrates to 
use the historical data and to predict the probability of occurrence of a failure in the 
future (IEC 31010:2009).  
During this work, historical data from the European Commission’s major accident 
reporting system (eMARS) has been analysed for past accidents occurring from 1988 
to 2012. The purpose of eMARS is to facilitate the exchange of lessons learned from 
accidents and near misses involving dangerous substances to improve the chemical 
accident prevention and mitigation of potential consequences (eMARS, 2014). It is 
obligatory for the European Union (EU) Member States to report major accidents to 
eMARS if the threshold of an event meets the criteria established in annex VI of the 
Seveso III Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU). Prior to Seveso III Directive, same 
practice was followed due to preceding Directives. The criteria to notify an accident 
is based on discharge amount of a dangerous substance listed in annex I of the 
Directive for lower and upper-tier establishments and also based on the consequences 
as a result of an accident. 
2 Accident Analysis 
The causal factors to accidents have been identified based on a subjective judgment. 
However, in order to ensure the consistency throughout the analysis, taxonomies for 
human and organizational factors were developed as illustrated in Table III. The main 
rationale behind the selection of these taxonomies are: 
1. Taxonomies should be quantifiable based on information present in eMARS 
 accident reports. 
2. Taxonomies should cover as much as possible all failures attributes as observed 
 during the preliminary analysis of accidents. 
The human factor behavioural/action taxonomy is slighted modified compared to 
PHEA taxonomy to cover different types of human/ operators actions. While, 
organizational factor taxonomy is modified from the taxonomy proposed by Øien 
(2001) to include the main organizational influencing factors. 
The accidents have been analysed according to modified Swiss cheese models which 
can provide a distinction according to initiating cause (i.e. technical or human) to an 
accident and subsequent diagnostic/preventive layers (i.e. technical or human). The 
Swiss cheese mode was proposed by James Reason, which among others can be 
found in Reason (2008). During the preliminary analysis of accidents, it has been 
observed that accidents occurred frequently due to the absence or malfunctioning of a 
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subsequent diagnostic/preventive layer. Therefore, modified Swiss cheese models are 
considered in this work to get a better understanding of accident’s evolution in time. 
Further information about accident models and use of modified Swiss cheese models 
can be found in Ahmad and Pontiggia (2015). 
Table III: Taxonomies and considered parameters  
Human factor taxonomy 
Organizational factor 
taxonomy 
Equipment 
involved 
Type of 
hazard 
1. Monitoring equipment from field 
(M) 
2. Monitoring/ operating equipments 
from control room (A) 
3. Communication (C) 
4. Manual tasks on-field (F) 
5. Reporting (R) 
1. Training (TO) 
2. Design (DO) 
3. Procedures (PO) 
4. Management (MO) 
5. Safety culture (SO) 
1. Pipework 
2. Vessel 
3. In-line 
equipment 
1. Flammable 
2. Toxic 
3. Both 
2.1 Results of Accident Analysis 
An accident analysis has been performed for accidents occurred from 1988 to 2012 
across seven industry types that typically are considered under the umbrella of 
chemical process industry as shown in Figure 2. A total 438 accidents have been 
analysed of which 197 accidents involved human or organizational characteristics 
during the accident.  
 
Figure 2. Total accidents versus accidents caused by HOF (1988-2012) 
In order to compare the trend of total accidents and accidents caused by HOF. The 
time period 1988-2010 was divided into two halves as shown in Figure 3. The %age 
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of accidents caused by HOF has increased from 43% to 47% during the period 2000-
2012. While, a decrease trend of total number of accidents was observed in the 
second half. The decreased trend of accidents could be due to the improved design 
and control of plants, which also adds more complexity to the operations. The added 
complexity can possibilily explain the increased trend of accidents due to HOF. 
During this analysis, it was observed that contractor’s operations are very critical and 
about 15% of total accidents were occurred when contractors were responsible for 
certain type of operations, mainly during maintenance activities. The accidents were 
also observed according to plant’s operating condition when accident actually 
occurred or when an abnormality was induced into the system as identified in post-
accident investigations.  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of total accidents and caused by HOF 
The Figure 4 shows the distribution of accidents in plant’s different operational stages 
and when among other causes contractor’s operation was also a cause to the accident. 
 
Figure 4. Accidents involving contractor in plant’s different operational stages 
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The Figure 5 illustrates the type of equipment involved during the accident and 
corresponding initiating cause to an accident. The use of modified Swiss cheese 
models can help to structure the initiating causes into three main classes. The three 
main classes have been identified as follows: 
1. Human 
2. Technical 
3. Technical + human 
Only those technical caused accidents are considered in which organizational 
attributes were present.  
 
Figure 5. Comparison of initiating causes and type of equipment 
In Figure 5, 8% of the analysed accidents did not provide enough information to 
identify the initiating causes to an accident or those accidents exhibit more complex 
situation. Therefore, those accidents are excluded from this comparison. Similarly, 
3% of analysed accident did not provide information about the involved equipments 
or the observed accident situation is too complex to identify the main involved 
equipment. However, “vessel” equipment is involved in most of the accidents 
irrelevant of initiating cause to the accident (i.e. 40%). These operations mainly 
involved human activities related to cleaning/maintenance of vessels and mostly 
carried out by the contractors.  
2.2 Affect of Organizational Factors  
The organizational factors which are reported in Table III have been observed for 
their influence on operator’s actions. If it is assumed, that situation during an accident 
is comparable to situation during normal operations with respect to organizational 
influence on human/ operator actions. In this case analysed accidents can provide  
estimates of the average comparative influence of organizational factors on human 
actions. However, it is reasonably possible that for some accidents more than one 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Human
Technical
Technical+
Human
In-line equipment
Vessel
Pipework
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organizational factor are involved, therefore Table IV shows the normalized affect of 
different organizational factors on human/operator action types.  
Table IV: Influencing affect of organizational factors on different action types   
 Type of layer 
PSFs 
 
 
Failures* 
Organizational factors** 
Training Design Procedures Management 
Safety 
culture 
M
a
in
 c
o
n
tr
ib
u
ti
n
g
 f
a
ct
o
rs
 
Operational 
layer 
Technical 0.11 0.25 0.24 0.38 - 
M 0.25 0.42 0.25 - - 
A 0.14 0.29 0.29 0.29 - 
C 0.44 0.11 0.44 - - 
F 0.21 0.20 0.37 0.18 - 
R - - - 1 - 
Diagnostic or 
preventive 
layer 
Technical 0.13 0.50 0.13 0.25 - 
M 0.30 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.20 
A 0.30 0.10 0.50 0.10 - 
F 0.29 - 0.57 0.14 - 
* Taxonomy from Table III. ** Only those values are reported with influencing affect ≥ 10%.    
Therefore, aforementioned table can provide the influencing affect of different 
organizational factor on different failure types (i.e. action types). Since human 
taxonomy is behavioural/action based taxonomy so by assuming that organizational 
influencing can vary among different action types, Table IV can provide weights of 
organizational factors on the human actions. A set of checklists have been developed 
during the accident analysis by identify the specific causes for each factor. The 
checklists have helped to remain consistent throughout the analysis and can also 
provide the future guidelines to avoid recurrences of same causes by analysing them 
prospectively.  
3 Quantification of Human Error Probability - Probabilistic Rasch 
Model 
Quantification of human error probabilities (HEPs) from past accidents require some 
further assumptions due to lack of available data and validation of available data. This 
challenge has also been identified by Sträter (2000) who has tried to obtain the HEP 
from the observed frequencies against the THERP database. Furthermore, Sträter 
(2000) argued that operational data is always reported by a certain threshold as shown 
by eq. (1). Therefore, only limited frequencies can be obtained from operational 
experience or from past accidents. In present work, the reporting thresholds are 
indicated by Seveso Directive (Directive 2012/18/EU). 
                                                                             (1) 
The Figure 6 illustrates the observed error frequencies against different actions types. 
The total number of observed instances were 172, when there was some kind of 
human (i.e. operator) error caused the accident. 
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In order to compare the obtained frequencies from accidents to existing database (e.g. 
THERP), Sträter (2000) argued that THERP database from Swain and Guttmann 
(1983) provides mostly values for rule-based behaviour or associated errors. 
Therefore, one can assume that for all actions, one would have to get roughly 
identical basic totalities of requirements. Since, rule-based behaviour idea is more 
connected to acquaintance of operator to an action of type i (i.e. frequency of use). 
Moreover, after comparing the assumptions of standard logarithmic distribution (used 
for THERP values) with the practical operational experience, Sträter (2000) has 
justified to compare the observed frequencies with THERP.  
 
Figure 6. Absolute and relative frequencies against different action types 
The concept of inherent human error and error caused by organizational factors has 
been used in this work as also used in ω-factor approach Mosleh et al. (1997). The 
relative frequencies for an action type (i.e.    ) is calculated according to eq. (2). 
      
 
  
                                                     (2) 
Whereas: 
M Total number of observed accidents 
mi Number of accidents corresponding to i
th
 action type (i.e. observed frequencies) 
ni Number of accidents with inherent human failures corresponding to i
th
 action 
 type  
In order to make the numerical adjustments to observed frequencies, calibration of 
frequencies was proposed by Sträter (2000) and probabilistic model according to 
Rasch has provided the maximum numerical agreement within THERP uncertainty 
bounds.  
The Rasch model assumes that observed values and true values of a property are 
interrelated via a item characteristic curve (monotonously rising function) Rasch, 
(1960). Since, Rasch model has been already modified and used by Sträter (2000). 
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
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Control room action/monitoring (A)
Communication (C)
Manual tasks on-field (F)
Reporting (R)
Diagnostic: M
Diagnostic: A
Diagnostic: F
ni' Inherent human error frequencies Total observed frequencies
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Therefore, in this work it has been decided to use the Rasch model to obtain the 
nominal HEPs from observed frequencies as done in the CAHR, Sträter (2000). 
3.1 The Rasch Model 
The modified Rasch model proposed by Sträter (2000) is provided by eq. (3)  
                   
 
                  
   
                  
   
   
     
   
 
 
      
  
 
    
 
      
  
 
                 (3) 
Whereas: 
n’i Relative frequency of i
th
 action type 
μ Mean value 
sn Deviation, determined by iterations (condition which provides the maximum 
 agreement with the THERP values). (Sn ≈ 5.41)  
Hence, by using the least square method and to verify if maximum predicted values 
from the Rasch model are within the uncertainty bounds of THERP values, HEPs are 
obtained for each action type.  
The Figure 7 shows the THERP values for each action type and the predicted values 
by Rasch model on logarithmic and normal scale against the relative frequency axis.  
 
Figure 7. Rasch model prediction against THERP values  
The Figure 8 illustrates a comparison of HEPs from THERP and the obtained HEPs 
from accident analysis for each action type. It can be observed that manual on-field 
operations (F) have an increased HEP compare to other action/error types, this is due 
to the fact that manual on-field operational errors have been observed in a higher 
frequency compare to other actions types. On the other hand, inherent control room 
actions (A) errors have been observed in fewer numbers, therefore HEP against this 
action type shows a decreased trend. This can also be explained by the division 
between industry domains (i.e. nuclear and chemical process), since THERP database 
was developed mainly for nuclear industry and accident analysis in this scope of work 
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has been performed in chemical process industry. Therefore, it can also be express 
that this analysis makes numerical adjustments to THERP HEPs against the observed 
failure events from chemical process industry. 
 
Figure 8. Comparison of predicted HEPs of Rasch model and THERP HEPs (operational & diagnostic 
layer) 
4 New Methodology: Method for Error Deduction and Incident 
Analysis (MEDIA) 
The Figure 9 illustrates the framework of new proposed method, method for error 
deduction and incident analysis (MEDIA). In MEDIA, all the organizational PSF can 
be rated on a likert scale by an analyst using the provided checklists by analysing the 
extent to which the considered attributes are embedded in a specific plant. An 
example of these checklists has been provided in Ahmad et al. (2015).  The combined 
affect of PSF for an action type can be calculated by using eq. (4). 
                     
   
   
 (4) 
Whereas: 
   Weight of n
th
 PSF, from (Table IV) 
   Rating of n
th
 PSF 
The critical human interventions can be identified from process and instrumentation 
diagrams (P&IDs), HAZOP output and other relevant studies. A separate set of 
checklists has been developed for each of the human action types. The obtained 
nominal HEPs from the Rasch model have been changed to HEPs by using the 
SPAR-H method according to eq. (5) as mentioned in Gertman et al. (2005, p.56). 
    
                  
                       
  (5) 
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The criticality of an action failure is considered by using the concept of safety layers. 
It has been observed that whenever failure of an action corresponds to a higher safety 
layer the consequences of failure are also severe, mainly due to possible absence of 
subsequent safety layers. For example, if monitoring of an alarm fails for an event 
and event has analysed to be credible during risk assessment, there should be 
subsequent safety layer (e.g. double alarms, SIFs etc). Assuming that subsequence 
layers will work (when required), these layers have potential to bring system back 
under safe conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Framework of method for error deduction and incident analysis (MEDIA) 
Yes 
No 
Improve 
Decrease 
Decrease 
option 2 
To 
 
 
 
  
Do 
P0 
Mo  
So 
 
PSFCombined 
Identify critical human actions 
for each taxonomy class in an 
isolatable section (use of provide 
checklists) 
HEP estimation 
(SPAR-H) 
RiskIndex 
(for isolatble section) 
Is risk 
acceptable? 
Treatment? 
P
S
F
s 
Associated safety layer 
 (i.e. 1-4, Fig 1) 
Frequency of action 
(e.g. per year) 
Move to next 
isolatable section 
Advanced HOF assessment models 
(for that isolatable section) 
Scale (rn): 
1,2,3,.....10 (use of provided checklists) 
Option 1 
Proceedings of the 49
th
 ESReDA Seminar, Brussels, Belgium, October 29-30, 2015 
 14 
On the other hand, if a human failure occurs in a higher safety layers (e.g. 
maintenance of PSVs or proof testing of SISs) and not detected in-time. In this case, 
due to possible absence of subsequent layers, human failure can lead to much severe 
consequences. 
Meanwhile, frequency of human interventions for a specific time period is also 
considered as shown in Figure 9. The obtained risk index for a specific isolable 
section can reduce by improving the PSF quality, by decreasing the frequency of 
operations or by decreasing the associated safety layer. The associated safety layer 
can also be decrease by providing an addition manual supervision. It has been 
observed that lack of supervision especially during contractor’s operations was one of 
the main causes of accidents. 
5 Discussion 
The past accidents can provide the required data for quantification of human factors 
and to provide estimates of organizational influence on operations. However, 
estimates are based on certain assumptions. But, giving the fact of inadequacy of  
existing data and its validation to quantify the HOF especially in chemical process 
industry, this work can provide estimates of HOF quantification. These estimates can 
also be used in other calculation methods (e.g. FTA, etc). 
The new proposed methodology (i.e. MEDIA) can provide an indication about the 
critical sections in a plant with respect to HOF, where more resources and times 
should be spend. Since checklists are based on past accident events, therefore 
considered attributes can provide more relevant aspects to be improved in order to 
improve the overall plant situation. However, MEDIA cannot account for the internal 
human PSF and time stress, therefore based on initial indication further analyse can 
be followed by using more advanced human reliability and cognitive methods. 
Alternatively, the checklists can also be used during the HAZID analysis according to 
the guidelines provided by ISO (2000). A case study of MEDIA is being carried out 
for a gas treatment plant. An immediate validation of HOF data is difficult to carry 
out through operational experience. However, the obtained HEPs are comparable with 
already existed HF data.  
The future work can be focused to provide rating of organizational attributes by using 
key performance indicators (KPIs). The aspect of using KPIs is considered to be more 
practical than sheer ratings since most of the industries observe and maintain their 
KPIs database.   
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